view mercurial/sslutil.py @ 26117:4dc5b51f38fe

revlog: change generaldelta delta parent heuristic The old generaldelta heuristic was "if p1 (or p2) was closer than the last full text, use it, otherwise use prev". This was problematic when a repo contained multiple branches that were very different. If commits to branch A were pushed, and the last full text was branch B, it would generate a fulltext. Then if branch B was pushed, it would generate another fulltext. The problem is that the last fulltext (and delta'ing against `prev` in general) has no correlation with the contents of the incoming revision, and therefore will always have degenerate cases. According to the blame, that algorithm was chosen to minimize the chain length. Since there is already code that protects against that (the delta-vs-fulltext code), and since it has been improved since the original generaldelta algorithm went in (2011), I believe the chain length criteria will still be preserved. The new algorithm always diffs against p1 (or p2 if it's closer), unless the resulting delta will fail the delta-vs-fulltext check, in which case we delta against prev. Some before and after stats on manifest.d size. internal large repo old heuristic - 2.0 GB new heuristic - 1.2 GB mozilla-central old heuristic - 242 MB new heuristic - 261 MB The regression in mozilla central is due to the new heuristic choosing p2r as the delta when it's closer to the tip. Switching the algorithm to always prefer p1r brings the size back down (242 MB). This is result of the way in which mozilla does merges and pushes, and the result could easily swing the other direction in other repos (depending on if they merge X into Y or Y into X), but will never be as degenerate as before. I future patch will address the regression by introducing an optional, even more aggressive delta heuristic which will knock the mozilla manifest size down dramatically.
author Durham Goode <durham@fb.com>
date Sun, 30 Aug 2015 13:58:11 -0700
parents 696f6e2be282
children 56b2bcea2529
line wrap: on
line source

# sslutil.py - SSL handling for mercurial
#
# Copyright 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
# Copyright 2006, 2007 Alexis S. L. Carvalho <alexis@cecm.usp.br>
# Copyright 2006 Vadim Gelfer <vadim.gelfer@gmail.com>
#
# This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the
# GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version.

from __future__ import absolute_import

import os
import ssl
import sys

from .i18n import _
from . import util

_canloaddefaultcerts = False
try:
    ssl_context = ssl.SSLContext
    _canloaddefaultcerts = util.safehasattr(ssl_context, 'load_default_certs')

    def wrapsocket(sock, keyfile, certfile, ui, cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE,
                   ca_certs=None, serverhostname=None):
        # Allow any version of SSL starting with TLSv1 and
        # up. Note that specifying TLSv1 here prohibits use of
        # newer standards (like TLSv1_2), so this is the right way
        # to do this. Note that in the future it'd be better to
        # support using ssl.create_default_context(), which sets
        # up a bunch of things in smart ways (strong ciphers,
        # protocol versions, etc) and is upgraded by Python
        # maintainers for us, but that breaks too many things to
        # do it in a hurry.
        sslcontext = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23)
        sslcontext.options &= ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2 & ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3
        if certfile is not None:
            def password():
                f = keyfile or certfile
                return ui.getpass(_('passphrase for %s: ') % f, '')
            sslcontext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, password)
        sslcontext.verify_mode = cert_reqs
        if ca_certs is not None:
            sslcontext.load_verify_locations(cafile=ca_certs)
        elif _canloaddefaultcerts:
            sslcontext.load_default_certs()

        sslsocket = sslcontext.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=serverhostname)
        # check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been
        # closed
        # - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
        if not sslsocket.cipher():
            raise util.Abort(_('ssl connection failed'))
        return sslsocket
except AttributeError:
    def wrapsocket(sock, keyfile, certfile, ui, cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE,
                   ca_certs=None, serverhostname=None):
        sslsocket = ssl.wrap_socket(sock, keyfile, certfile,
                                    cert_reqs=cert_reqs, ca_certs=ca_certs,
                                    ssl_version=ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1)
        # check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been
        # closed
        # - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
        if not sslsocket.cipher():
            raise util.Abort(_('ssl connection failed'))
        return sslsocket

def _verifycert(cert, hostname):
    '''Verify that cert (in socket.getpeercert() format) matches hostname.
    CRLs is not handled.

    Returns error message if any problems are found and None on success.
    '''
    if not cert:
        return _('no certificate received')
    dnsname = hostname.lower()
    def matchdnsname(certname):
        return (certname == dnsname or
                '.' in dnsname and certname == '*.' + dnsname.split('.', 1)[1])

    san = cert.get('subjectAltName', [])
    if san:
        certnames = [value.lower() for key, value in san if key == 'DNS']
        for name in certnames:
            if matchdnsname(name):
                return None
        if certnames:
            return _('certificate is for %s') % ', '.join(certnames)

    # subject is only checked when subjectAltName is empty
    for s in cert.get('subject', []):
        key, value = s[0]
        if key == 'commonName':
            try:
                # 'subject' entries are unicode
                certname = value.lower().encode('ascii')
            except UnicodeEncodeError:
                return _('IDN in certificate not supported')
            if matchdnsname(certname):
                return None
            return _('certificate is for %s') % certname
    return _('no commonName or subjectAltName found in certificate')


# CERT_REQUIRED means fetch the cert from the server all the time AND
# validate it against the CA store provided in web.cacerts.

def _plainapplepython():
    """return true if this seems to be a pure Apple Python that
    * is unfrozen and presumably has the whole mercurial module in the file
      system
    * presumably is an Apple Python that uses Apple OpenSSL which has patches
      for using system certificate store CAs in addition to the provided
      cacerts file
    """
    if sys.platform != 'darwin' or util.mainfrozen() or not sys.executable:
        return False
    exe = os.path.realpath(sys.executable).lower()
    return (exe.startswith('/usr/bin/python') or
            exe.startswith('/system/library/frameworks/python.framework/'))

def _defaultcacerts():
    """return path to CA certificates; None for system's store; ! to disable"""
    if _plainapplepython():
        dummycert = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'dummycert.pem')
        if os.path.exists(dummycert):
            return dummycert
    if _canloaddefaultcerts:
        return None
    return '!'

def sslkwargs(ui, host):
    kws = {'ui': ui}
    hostfingerprint = ui.config('hostfingerprints', host)
    if hostfingerprint:
        return kws
    cacerts = ui.config('web', 'cacerts')
    if cacerts == '!':
        pass
    elif cacerts:
        cacerts = util.expandpath(cacerts)
        if not os.path.exists(cacerts):
            raise util.Abort(_('could not find web.cacerts: %s') % cacerts)
    else:
        cacerts = _defaultcacerts()
        if cacerts and cacerts != '!':
            ui.debug('using %s to enable OS X system CA\n' % cacerts)
        ui.setconfig('web', 'cacerts', cacerts, 'defaultcacerts')
    if cacerts != '!':
        kws.update({'ca_certs': cacerts,
                    'cert_reqs': ssl.CERT_REQUIRED,
                    })
    return kws

class validator(object):
    def __init__(self, ui, host):
        self.ui = ui
        self.host = host

    def __call__(self, sock, strict=False):
        host = self.host
        cacerts = self.ui.config('web', 'cacerts')
        hostfingerprint = self.ui.config('hostfingerprints', host)

        if not sock.cipher(): # work around http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
            raise util.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)
        try:
            peercert = sock.getpeercert(True)
            peercert2 = sock.getpeercert()
        except AttributeError:
            raise util.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)

        if not peercert:
            raise util.Abort(_('%s certificate error: '
                               'no certificate received') % host)
        peerfingerprint = util.sha1(peercert).hexdigest()
        nicefingerprint = ":".join([peerfingerprint[x:x + 2]
            for x in xrange(0, len(peerfingerprint), 2)])
        if hostfingerprint:
            if peerfingerprint.lower() != \
                    hostfingerprint.replace(':', '').lower():
                raise util.Abort(_('certificate for %s has unexpected '
                                   'fingerprint %s') % (host, nicefingerprint),
                                 hint=_('check hostfingerprint configuration'))
            self.ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s\n' %
                          (host, nicefingerprint))
        elif cacerts != '!':
            msg = _verifycert(peercert2, host)
            if msg:
                raise util.Abort(_('%s certificate error: %s') % (host, msg),
                                 hint=_('configure hostfingerprint %s or use '
                                        '--insecure to connect insecurely') %
                                      nicefingerprint)
            self.ui.debug('%s certificate successfully verified\n' % host)
        elif strict:
            raise util.Abort(_('%s certificate with fingerprint %s not '
                               'verified') % (host, nicefingerprint),
                             hint=_('check hostfingerprints or web.cacerts '
                                     'config setting'))
        else:
            self.ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s not '
                           'verified (check hostfingerprints or web.cacerts '
                           'config setting)\n') %
                         (host, nicefingerprint))